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Abstract. Labelling resettlement programs as voluntary suggests that they cause little contention 
and are devoid of coercion. But is this representation accurate? Drawing on unpublished 
government documents and media reports, we provide a detailed case study of the Community 
Relocation Policy (CRP) of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) from 2009 to the present. We 
show that CRP has been fraught with contention due to the nature of the voting process and the 
slow and uncertain nature of the community-oriented consultative process. This article highlights 
the way in which coercion has emerged from the very communities considering resettlement, in 
addition to any coercion that might come from government officials. 
Résumé 
Le fait que les programmes de réinstallation soient étiquetés comme volontaires laisse entendre 
qu'ils suscitent peu d’opposition et qu’ils n’impliquent aucune contrainte. Mais cette 
représentation est-elle exacte ? S’appuyant sur des documents gouvernementaux inédits et de 
comptes rendus médiatiques, nous fournissons une étude de cas détaillée de la Community 
Relocation Policy (CRP) instaurée dans la province de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador (T.-N.-L.), de 
2009 à aujourd'hui. Nous montrons que la CRP a été très controversée en raison de la nature du 
processus de vote, conjuguée à la lenteur et au caractère incertain du processus consultatif axé 
sur la communauté. Cette étude souligne que la coercition a émergé des communautés mêmes 
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qui envisagent de se réinstaller, en plus d’émerger de leurs interactions avec les représentants du 
gouvernement. 
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Introduction: Uprooting People 
The practice of resettling people, uprooting them from their homes and homelands, has deep-
seated social, economic and political implications. A large body of literature has examined the 
contentious politics surrounding the coerced resettlement schemes operating in many 
nondemocratic and democratizing states of the Global South (Wilmsen and Webber, 2017; 
Martin, 2001). Bringing together three familiar features of social life—contention, collective 
action and politics—contentious politics encompass wide-ranging strategies of both lethal and 
nonlethal group resistance, including less sustained forms of contention, such as strikes and riots, 
and more extensive ones, such as civil wars and episodes of democratization (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007: 4). But authoritarian states are not the only regime type that engages in demographic 
engineering. Canada (Withers, 2016) and the United States (Maldonado et al., 2013) have also 
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implemented resettlement schemes, and studies suggest that they will continue to do so in the 
foreseeable future due to economic and ecological pressures (see, for example, Hamilton et al., 
2016). Notwithstanding the upsurge of media and government attention to large migration flows, 
there have been few efforts to theorize the contentious politics of population resettlement 
programs involving the so-called voluntary relocation of internal or domestic migrants.1 Are 
“voluntary” community resettlement programs contention-free? What sources of coercion are 
present and how do they operate in situations where resettlement is community-driven? 
This article contributes to the literature on population resettlement, contentious politics 
and coercion by providing an in-depth analysis of the Community Relocation Policy (CRP) of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) from 2009 to present.2 The CRP represents a crucial case for 
the study of coercion in resettlement since in an effort to avoid critiques of heavy-handedness 
that plagued previous resettlement schemes,3 the government now requires all communities 
interested in obtaining relocation assistance to pass through a four-stage process ending with a 
community vote, and it also provides generous financial assistance to cover the costs of 
relocation. If a resettlement program were to be genuinely contention- and coercion-free, the 
CRP should be it. 
We first review the literature on resettlement and contentious politics before summarizing 
our methodological approach. We then provide an in-depth assessment of the latest resettlement 
program in NL, identifying the conditions fostering contention between the three primary 
stakeholders involved: the individuals/families resettled, the host communities where people 
resettled and the government officials participating in the process. Our media analysis shows that 
the CRP has been fraught with (nonlethal) contention, despite being community-initiated and 
community-driven. Delving into this puzzle, we show that a growing source of contention within 
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the CRP is the indirect coercive pressure emerging from within the very communities seeking 
resettlement. We pinpoint two new sources of coercion: the small group of people “holding 
hostage” the rest of the population wishing to relocate (that is, coercion by the minority) and 
those exercising pressure on the few undecided voters (that is, coercion by the majority). We 
conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of resettlement programs for NL and rural 
communities in the Western world. 
Resettlement Programs and Contentious Politics 
The broad field of resettlement studies focuses on planned population movements and takes 
stock of the causes and consequences of resettlement, as well as the structure, actors and policies 
involved. According to Vanclay’s (2017: 6) definition, resettlement involves “the comprehensive 
process of planning for and implementing the relocation of people, households, and communities 
from one place to another for some specific reason, together with all associated activities.” In 
other words, resettlement is a process that begins before and continues long after communities or 
individuals move. It is distinct from other forms of ad hoc relocation because it involves 
relatively permanent, organized movement by an entire community (King, 2017). 
Resettlement schemes are common practices in several nondemocratic or democratizing 
states of the Global South (Kassymbekova, 2011; Xue et al., 2013; Tirtosudarmo, 2001; Martin, 
2001; Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). Authoritarian states—with their extensive reliance on 
coercion (that is, on the compelling of individuals to obey by threatening their lives or 
livelihoods), limited room for debate, control over the media and access to extensive financial 
and material resources—are particularly well positioned to organize population movements 
(Côté, 2014). This is not to say that other political regimes have shied away from relying on 
population resettlement to promote their respective agendas. In India, over 60 million people 
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have been involuntary displaced for various development projects since the country’s 
independence (CSD, 2008). Established Western democracies have likewise adopted 
resettlement schemes—for example, Canada’s controversial Inuit Resettlement Project relocated 
Inuit families to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord in the 1950s so that Canada could claim 
sovereignty in the High Artic (Grant, 2016). 
While a country’s political regime and institutions affect the parameters of resettlement 
(such as the organization of resettlement or the rapidity of implementation), they also affect its 
political impacts, shaping how groups respond to resettlement and making resettlement more or 
less contentious (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007; Ramos and Rodgers, 2015). In particular, a major 
debate within the scholarship on resettlement concerns the role that coercion plays in fostering 
contentious politics (see, for example, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). What constitutes coercion is 
not always clear, however, and dissatisfaction has grown in recent years over the conventional 
categorization of migration and resettlement as either voluntary or forced. Even when 
resettlement is voluntary, Lyall (2017) cautions that observers must not lose sight of the 
potentially coercive practices by the state, nor should they ignore the legacies of oppression and 
disenfranchisement that may have led to certain kinds of decision making. Along similar lines, 
Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington’s (2007: 2184) investigation of development-induced 
resettlement in Cameroon revealed how prevalent coercive pressures are, even in cases where 
people formally consented to, and were compensated for, relocation. As the authors conclude, 
the current understanding of voluntary resettlement is missing the needed emphasis on informed, 
prior and free consent, along with the option not to relocate (2007: 2194). Gebre’s (2002: 270) 
framework further expands on the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy by introducing two 
additional categories of resettlement: compulsory-voluntary, where resettlement is deliberately 
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induced by outside agencies or government; and induced-voluntary, where people embrace 
relocation out of desperation. The latter draws parallels with Wilmsen and Wang’s (2015: 617) 
“coercion by deprivation,” where people may initially choose to stay behind and not participate 
in resettlement programs but are ultimately forced to relocate due to the long-term consequences 
of state-organized resettlement. 
Together, these studies highlight the multiple forms that coerced resettlement may take, 
contributing to a more refined understanding of the full spectrum of resettlement practices. 
However, nearly all of them adopt a narrow understanding of coercion, focusing on state-
exercised coercion to the exclusion of other sources of coercion. This is not entirely surprising 
since a majority of resettlement schemes are initiated, organized and funded by state actors, be 
they national government officials, as in Indonesia (Tirtosudarmo, 2001), or subnational 
government workers, as in NL or Quebec (see Loo, 2019). For this reason, the most common 
form of resettlement-induced contentious politics involves community members and state actors, 
where those carrying out resettlement policies and applying coercion—that is, government 
officials—are targeted by the population (to be) resettled. But state representatives are not all 
equally at risk of being targeted by contention. Oliver-Smith (1991) points out that ethnic 
differences between the ruling elites and the population to be relocated make resistance more 
likely. Conversely, ethnic differences between agents of resettlement and the host communities 
may turn migration into a contentious process if the receiving community sees mass resettlement 
as a tool to reduce their demographic and political power (Bookman, 2002). In this context, host 
communities may express their opposition to resettlement by clashing with incoming migrants, a 
dynamic best examined by Weiner (1978) in his work on “Sons of the Soil” conflicts. 
Absent from this academic literature is a focus on the tensions and coercion emerging 
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within the communities considering resettlement. Despite their small size, such communities are 
far from homogenous, consisting of people of different socio-economic backgrounds, with 
access to varying levels of social and financial capital. Focusing solely on state coercive 
practices glosses over the fact that within-community power differentials and inequalities exist 
and that these may affect group relations and resettlement dynamics. 
Approaching Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador 
European populations first started settling in the territory currently encompassed by the province 
of NL in the sixteenth century; their reliance on fishing resources ultimately lead to the creation 
of 1,200 sparsely populated communities scattered over 29,000 kilometres of coastline. When 
NL joined Canadian Confederation in 1949, the highly dispersed population and economic 
dependence on small-scale fishing was blamed for the province’s high unemployment, low levels 
of production, lack of technical advancement and difficulties in ensuring access to government 
services and health care facilities (Matthews, 1978). Resettling poor, isolated communities in NL 
was one tool in a broader set of postwar strategies that sought to modernize the fishery, 
centralize populations around “growth poles” and spread “social and material rights” to all 
Canadian citizens (Blake, 2015: 104; Loo, 2019). 
There have been three distinct economic resettlement programs in NL’s history (see 
Table 1). The province’s Centralization Plan  (1954–1965) saw the relocation of 115 
communities as part of a broader set of socio-economic reforms introduced by Premier Joseph R. 
Smallwood (Matthews 1978: 89). The second program, the Newfoundland Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program (FHRP) was a federal-provincial program, later called the Resettlement 
Scheme (1970–1977). In total, these two programs moved 20,614 people (or 4,094 households) 
(FHRP, n.d.) to 77 “growth centres” (Matthews, 1978: 98). In 2009, after three decades of 
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dormancy, the province introduced a third program: the Community Relocation Policy (CRP). 
While a substantial body of literature has focused on the first two programs—linking them to 
fisheries modernization (Wright, 2001), the evolution of Canadian federalism (Blake, 2015) and 
the political culture of postwar Canada (Loo, 2019)—the current wave of resettlement is still 
unexplored. 
{Typesetter: Table 1 about here} 
Recent research on the pre-1977 resettlement programs underscores that the state held far 
from complete control over the resettlement process. Some communities, such as Fogo Island 
and Harbour Deep (Withers, 2016), successfully resisted pressure to resettle, while others, such 
as Pushthrough, fought for their own resettlement (Blake, 2015). People and households used 
resettlement for their own advantage and often in ways that undermined the government’s goals 
(Loo, 2019). Previous research has also documented the anger and contentious politics 
surrounding the first two resettlement periods, including in letters of correspondence to 
government agencies and local officials (Matthews, 1970). Withers (2016) illustrates the 
considerable tension between existing and new residents within communities such as Arnold’s 
Cove that were designated as growth centres. Local and national media coverage played a role in 
magnifying these tensions (Withers, 2016). 
Resettlement in NL was—and still is—closely intertwined with the fisheries. The 
collapse of northern cod stocks in the early 1990s shook NL’s economy to its core, prompting a 
moratorium that put 35,000 fishers and plant workers out of work, inducing out-migration and 
decline across NL’s coastal communities (Mather, 2013). Although resettlement was no longer 
actively pursued from 1978 to 2009, the economic downturn propelled some small and isolated 
9 
 
communities to quietly request—and obtain—government assistance to relocate, including Great 
Harbour Deep in 2002, Petites in 2003 and Big Brook in 2004. In 2009, the CRP formalized the 
process by which communities could potentially receive financial compensation for resettlement. 
Like the pre-1977 resettlement programs, the CRP has been the subject of substantial 
controversy. This article focuses on the community and community–state dynamics of this 
process, asking what the CRP reveals about the relationship between coercion and contentious 
politics in democratic resettlement decision and exploring what sources of coercion are present 
and how these source of coercion operate in situations such as the CRP, where resettlement is 
community-driven. 
Methodology 
To address these questions, we adopted a qualitative multisource approach, including analysis of 
media, publicly available policy documents and unpublished government documents. Mixed data 
collection has the benefit of minimizing selection bias (what is covered) and description bias 
(how information is covered) (Mügge, 2016). 
Newspapers are important data sources because they provide an information record of 
human activity, from protests to rebellion, and enable historical and comparative analysis (Earl et 
al., 2004). We used news stories as a record of public debate on resettlement, which allowed us 
to make inferences about attitudes toward resettlement and about the political impact of 
resettlement programs. We analyzed 88 news articles covering population resettlement in NL 
from four news sources available on Factiva and/or LexisNexis (two electronic news databases) 
that best represent the regional and national information landscapes: the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC), Canada’s national public broadcaster; the Globe and Mail, one of Canada’s 
leading daily newspapers; the Western Star, a local newspaper based on NL’s west coast; and the 
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Telegram, NL’s major daily newspaper based in St. John’s, the provincial capital. The media 
analysis covered the period from 2009, when the CRP was first introduced, to December 2016. 
Table 2 summarizes the frequency of relevant articles in the sample by newspaper. 
{Typesetter: Table 2 about here} 
After compiling the news stories, we manually applied a three-part coding scheme that 
categorized excerpts according to three research objective–driven frames: government, economic 
development and contentious politics. In the last, we included all excerpts associating 
resettlement with violent and nonviolent resistance, such as coalition formation, boycotts, 
building occupations, demonstrations, press statements, petitioning, letter writing to government 
officials, and arguments among community members or between resettled populations and the 
host communities (among others). Table 3 shows the code occurrence of contentious politics and 
the populations involved, while Table 4 shows the main factors contributing to contentious 
events.4 
{Typesetter: Table 3 and Table 4 about here} 
In an effort to triangulate and supplement the information obtained via our media 
analysis, we examined unreleased and/or unpublished documents, which we gained access to 
through three formal requests made under the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act (also known as ATIPP requests) to the NL government. The requests cover the period from 
2009, when the CRP was first introduced, to December 2016. The final sample totals nearly 1100 
pages: approximately half of this material consists of correspondence involving members of NL 
communities who submitted expressions of interest in resettling to the provincial government, 
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who requested information on the cost/benefit analysis or who contacted government staff to 
express their opinion on resettlement; the other half consists of internal memos between 
government officials on issues related to resettlement. 
A relatively new method for gathering qualitative data, ATIPP requests allow researchers 
to move beyond what is publicly available and access materials that government institutions may 
consider to be internal or even secret in nature (Turnbull, 2015). By getting at what Walby and 
Larsen (2011) call the “live archive”—the multitude of texts produced within governments on a 
daily basis—these documents provide detailed, dynamic insights into the tensions existing within 
and between communities and government officials, which otherwise are often beyond the reach 
of outsider researchers (Given, 2008). 
Case Study: Resettlement and Contentious Politics in NL, 2009– 
NL’s Community Relocation Policy (CRP) 
After a lull of nearly 30 years, the latest wave of policies actively supporting resettlement began 
in NL with the introduction of the 2009 CRP, resulting in the relocation of Grand Bruit in 2010. 
Socio-economic concerns motivated this new wave of government-assisted relocation: chronic 
unemployment in the fishery and an aging demographic, combined with the strain of providing 
government services to a far-flung population, made the government more receptive to 
community demands (CBC News, 2013). A civil servant working in the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs noted that requests for relocation started coming “fast and furious” (ATIPP, 2013: 263) 
after the introduction of the second CRP in 2013, which nearly tripled the buyout package 
offered to families, from $100,000 to $270,000 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
2013).5 The savings generated by the withdrawal of infrastructure, including power generation, 
regular ferry services and other essential utilities over a 20-year period, were expected to 
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compensate for the high immediate costs of the program. 
The various CRP instalments (2009, 2013 and 2016) went to great lengths to emphasize 
the CRP’s voluntary nature, stipulating that the Department of Municipal Affairs could only 
distribute information about relocation “provided it receives clear indication that it is responding 
to a community-initiated, community-driven request for relocation assistance” via a petition from 
community residents or a written request from a municipality (Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 2013). To qualify for resettlement, communities need to go through four distinct 
stages: 1) an initial expression of interest demonstrating that at least 90 per cent of the permanent 
population supports relocation, 2) a residency status determination conducted by the Department 
of Municipal Affairs confirming voter eligibility, 3) a cost/benefit analysis indicating clear 
savings for the government over a 20-year period, and 4) a community vote confirming support 
from at least 90 per cent of the permanent population of the community considering resettlement. 
These steps have proven so stringent that only the tiny community of William’s Harbour 
has relocated since the implementation of the 2013 CRP (CBC News, 2017), making it difficult 
to claim that the NL government is today actively and forcefully promoting out-migration from 
small outport communities. Of the other six communities that formally applied for resettlement, 
three have been rejected at various stages of this process (Nipper’s Harbour, McCallum and 
Gaultois), two are still waiting to find out their fate (Round Harbour and Snook’s Arm) while 
Little Bay Islands will relocate as of December 31, 2019 (CBC News, 2019b) (see Table 5 for a 
full list of communities initiating resettlement process). 
   [Insert Table 5 about here] 
The CRP and contentious politics 
Unlike forced resettlement schemes in nondemocratic states that often result in violent clashes 
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between the main stakeholders, resettlement never took a bloody turn under the CRP. Our media 
analysis reveals, however, that nonlethal contentious politics was prevalent, with 79 instances of 
resettlement-associated contentious politics from 2009–2016 (see Table 3). Coercive pressures to 
relocate (or not) were the main source of contention, followed by a lack of information and 
concerns over the decision process (see Table 4). Thanks to the increases to the buyout package 
over the years, the amount of financial compensation has rarely been the object of contention. 
One exception, however, occurred during a brief period after the introduction of the 2013 CRP, 
when communities resettled under older, less generous programs tried to retroactively obtain 
financial compensation along the lines of the 2013 CRP. 
Table 3 also highlights that most instances of contentious politics reported in our media 
analysis (48 out of 79) pit communities against government officials or state actors, a finding in 
line with the existing literature on resettlement and contention. It did not, however, reveal a 
single instance of contentious politics pitting resettled communities against their potential host 
communities. The comparatively modest scale of contemporary resettlement schemes in NL, 
typically affecting communities of 100 permanent residents or less, may have played a role in 
reducing the alleged demographic threat resettled families posed to the host communities (Pottie-
Sherman and Wilkes, 2017). Prior to their move, many of the soon-to-be-resettled people had 
already established connections with their future host communities, visiting them for medical 
appointments or shopping, for instance. These regular interactions meant that the migrants were 
not unknown to the host community, as was often the case in earlier resettlement programs.6 
Together with the fact that resettled individuals can now relocate wherever they wish—in NL or 
elsewhere—these measures have dispersed migrants and made it easier for host communities to 
absorb a more gradual population intake. 
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The 31 instances of contentious politics occurring within the communities considering 
resettlement were the most surprising result revealed by our analysis, especially given the silence 
of the literature on this dynamic. Digging deeper into the contentious politics in NL’s voluntary 
resettlement programs, we examine three aspects of the CRP—the negotiation of voting rights, 
the challenges of community voting and the slow and uncertain nature of the consultation 
process—that capture how coercion operates between communities and government officials, as 
well as within the communities seeking resettlement. In doing so, we uncover an important 
paradox: that the very measures initially designed to ensure the voluntary nature of resettlement 
in democratic settings such as NL often generate, rather than deter, coercive pressure and 
contentious politics. 
1) Negotiating voting rights 
The 2009 CRP restricted voting to permanent residents only, defined as those residing in the 
community for at least 183 days in each of the two 12-month periods immediately preceding the 
town’s relocation request (ATIPP, 2016a: 28). If the vote was positive, permanent residents 
would receive the full compensation package for the commercial and residential properties they 
were leaving behind. In contrast, seasonal residents were barred from voting on this issue and did 
not qualify for the full government buyout. 
With such high stakes, deciding who had the right to vote became litigious. Since 2013, 
residents have filed 39 appeals in four separate relocation cases (ATIPP, 2016a: 1, 62). Given the 
size of most NL communities and the high threshold required for resettlement to proceed, a small 
adjustment to the number of eligible voters could have a major impact on the outcome. In the 
case of Little Bay Islands, a small fishing community off the northern coast that had seen the 
closing of its fish plant, the successful appeals of voting-aged permanent residents resulted in 
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eight additional people able to cast their vote in the first resettlement vote in 2015 (ATIPP, 2013: 
10). Considering its close results, with 85 ballots in favour of resettlement and 10 against, the 
inclusion of a handful of votes may have been sufficient to sway the outcome. 
Several residents from Little Bay Islands expressed concerns that the vote was an “unfair 
process” because it included nonpermanent residents who were absent from the community for 
nearly half a year (Barry, 2016). Seasonal, nonpermanent residents were equally irate about not 
having their voice heard and being barred from financial compensation from the government for 
their seasonal residence, should resettlement proceed. As one letter to the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs from the Coalition to Save Little Bay Islands stated: 
We feel that if all homeowners/taxpayers do not have a say, they are being treated 
unfairly, as we are all taxpayers paying the same amount whether we live in the 
town full time or not as taxes are not adjusted for part time residents. (ATIPP, 
2013: 183–84) 
Another resident from Little Bay Islands addressed the Minister in a postcard, pleading: 
“This is my home. Please do not attempt to destroy it” (ATIPP, 2013: 176–77). Seasonal 
residents of other communities considering resettlement shared similar concerns. A letter sent to 
the same Minister by seasonal residents in the South Coast community of McCallum noted: 
We have invested a great deal of money into our home and my question to you 
and your department Mr. O’Brien is why? Why should we have to lose everything 
that we have worked so hard over the years because the majority rules and we 
have no other choice but to leave? (ATIPP, 2013: 318–20) 
In response to these concerns, a 2016 review of the CRP changed the definition of 
permanent residents to require year-round residency, with appropriate exemptions for work, 
schooling and medical reasons. It is unclear if this amendment will resolve the eligibility 
problems raised earlier by both permanent and temporary residents. Indeed, when asked about 
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these changes, one part-time resident from Little Bay Islands stated: “I’m not impressed. They 
[government officials] are just trying to separate one taxpayer from another” (Cook, 2016). 
2) Community voting: coercive pressures from the minority and the majority 
In most instances of voluntary economic migration, the decision to relocate is an individual or 
household one. Even then, the decision to relocate is the result of a long and intricate reflection 
about the respective pros and cons. In contrast, when relocation takes place at the community 
level—for example, when nearly every inhabitant of a community must agree to relocate for the 
resettlement scheme to go ahead—household decisions are compounded by many additional 
circumstances, notably the need to decide the minimum threshold necessary for community 
relocation to take place. 
The threshold for resettlement under the CRP has fluctuated between 90 and 95 per cent, 
which is significantly higher than the 50 per cent +1 vote usually required for a majority in 
democracies. Although meant to foster community-based decision making, the high threshold for 
resettlement ultimately gave tremendous power to a handful of people (sometimes as few as one 
or two individuals) who steadfastly refused to relocate, thereby “holding hostage” the rest of the 
community who may have preferred to move. A resident of George’s Cove, a small community 
that failed to meet the threshold for resettlement, explained: “Quebec would have separated from 
Canada if they got 50-plus one per cent. If you have 70 or 80 per cent, they [the government] 
should let the people move who wants to move” (Hurley, 2013). This criticism raises the 
question whether government-assisted resettlement may, in fact, be counterproductive, to the 
degree that it encourages holdouts among households with the means to relocate but who prefer 
to wait for the government buyout package to do so. Were the financial incentives to disappear, 
such individuals would leave their community, thus allowing the government to stop ensuring 
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services. While this question is valid, a newspaper interview with the town clerk from Little Bay 
Islands suggests that most people who had the means to relocate have already done so: 
I cannot believe that 10 people out of 95 are able to hold the other 85 of us 
hostage in this community, with the majority being seniors and the majority of 
them who worked in the fishery all their life and being seasonal workers, they 
don’t have the income to back them up to move on their own. (Telegram, 2016) 
The results of the 2015 relocation vote in Little Bay Islands, with 89.47 per cent of the 
population in favour of resettlement, tested the strictness of government adherence to the 
threshold and highlighted the highly controversial nature of a few decimal points. A former 
mayor of Little Bay Islands cautioned: “It’s not going to be a pleasant time in this community if 
the number is not there” (that is, if the government did not round up the figure to the required 90 
per cent) (CBC News, 2015). After a lengthy review of the rules, the province reaffirmed that 
community relocation would only proceed if at least 90 per cent of all permanent residents in a 
town agreed (Barry, 2016). 
As expected, this decision was not well received in Little Bay Islands. When one resident 
found out that the process of relocation would not proceed, he indicated his “unbelief and utter 
disgust,” claiming that residents of Little Bay Islands, after being part of this process for several 
years, felt as if they had been “kicked in the gut while [they] were down” (ATIPP, 2016a: 57–
58). Another resident said: “My disappointment is not in the people of Little Bay Islands, my 
disappointment is in the government” (Cook, 2016). The residents of Little Bay Islands 
eventually mended their wounds and voted unanimously in favour of resettlement in February of 
2019 (CBC News, 2019a), while the NL government recently approved 10 million dollars to 
relocate the remaining 54 permanent residents(Power, 2019).This high threshold was adopted to 
ensure that no one would be forced to move against their will. But requiring such a high degree 
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of consensus, where a handful of votes may suffice to prevent resettlement, damaged the unity of 
small communities. Asked about the effect of resettlement talks in his town, a resident of 
McCallum said: “There’s a lot of animosity within the community and it’s really hard to 
communicate with people . . . they’ve created a lot of broken families, friends and divided the 
community” (Howells, 2015). Part of the problem is that it is nearly impossible for people to 
vote truly anonymously in small communities, where everyone knows one another: 
No one knows who voted for or who voted against because that was never 
released by government, but of course you live in the town and it’s a small place 
and you hear people say “Well I hope this don’t go through” or “I hope it do go 
through”, so you do have ideas of which way they voted. . . . Everyone has their 
suspicions. (Telegram, 2016) 
Alternatively, individuals who wanted to stay often experienced coercive group pressures 
from the majority of the population. In these cases, employed permanent residents, often a small 
segment of the population in aging communities dependent on fishing, resented being driven 
from their homes by the unemployed or underemployed majority. As one employed resident of 
Little Bay Islands explained in his personal communication to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, 
not-so-subtle threats were made toward him and his family: 
We are being told by those wanting to leave, if we do not vote for the latest offer, 
this will not be a friendly neighbourhood. This program [resettlement] is already 
destroying our community and it will certainly destroy my life if I have to give up 
my job and move, but irreparable damage has already been done and for the 
safety and well-being of my family, I will have to go. (ATIPP, 2013: 174) 
In an effort to accommodate those wishing to stay put, the 2009 CRP initially ensured 
that the government would provide residual services (electricity, water, snow-clearing) to 
residents choosing to remain in a relocated community. This provision was, however, cut in the 
2016 revisions of the CRP.7 Residents must now weigh their desire to stay in a community 
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without access to drinking water or electricity against saying goodbye to a place that has been 
their home for generations. The 31 permanent residents of Grand Bruit faced such a dilemma as 
they saw their school close, followed by the post office, and the end of ferry and power services 
in the summer of 2010 (Thomas, 2010). When communities have fewer and fewer services at 
their disposal, one can wonder about the way in which the subtle pressure on people to either 
move or do without amenities undermines the claim that these individuals are truly “choosing” to 
relocate. 
3) Slow nature of consultation process 
The above discussion also highlights another disputed dimension of resettlement in NL: the slow 
and uncertain nature of the current community-oriented consultative process. The four distinct 
steps of the process can easily drag on over several years, creating substantial uncertainty for 
those directly involved. In Little Bay Islands, over six years elapsed from the time the 
community initially expressed interest in participating in the CRP in April 2013 to their 
relocation on December 31st, 2019 (CBC News, 2019b). During these waiting times, 
communities considering resettlement are frozen. Months—and in some cases, years—of 
uncertainty drain small outport communities of their social vitality. Towns that are already 
struggling to prevent youth out-migration now face the seemingly insurmountable task of filling 
vacancies on a town council or maintaining a functioning fire department in the context of an 
aging population. Once these vital community services are lost, total abandonment is almost 
inevitable. Residents, fearing they will have to leave sooner or later, refuse to invest in the 
upkeep of either communal or private property, making it harder for them to sell their properties 
in the future were resettlement not to go ahead. A series of letters written by residents of Little 
Bay Islands to various government officials captured increasing frustration at the length of the 
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process and the negative impact it had on community morale and relations (ATIPP, 2016a: 65, 
67). Little Bay Islands was not the only community in limbo. After a decisive 97 per cent vote in 
favour of resettlement in the spring of 2009, the community of Grand Bruit spent the summer 
wondering if the government would agree with its wishes. As the chair of the local service 
district explained: 
We’ve been on hold and everyone in the community has been worried about this 
all summer long. Some people have things they would want to do with their 
homes if they are going to be staying here for the next five years or more, but 
which can probably wait if they will only be using their homes as summer 
cottages. (Kean, 2009) 
 
Conclusion 
As this case study demonstrates, community-initiated and community-driven resettlement 
programs like CRP are also fraught with contention due to the nature of the voting process and 
the slow and uncertain nature of the community-oriented consultative process. Measures that 
were meant to democratize resettlement and give agency to those most affected by it—that is, 
voting rights for permanent residents only, a community vote, the high minimum threshold 
needed, the numerous occasions where public opinion is sought after and the generous financial 
compensation offered—have, in fact, generated insidious and indirect coercive pressures 
affecting people’s decision to relocate or not to relocate. 
The literature on large-scale resettlement had so far emphasized the coercive pressures 
government officials exert on individuals, stripping them of agency. While direct government 
pressures are largely absent from contemporary NL resettlement programs, indirect government 
coercion remains, in the form of delays and service disruption. Our examination of the CRP 
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showed, however, that state officials are not the only actors applying coercive pressures. 
Coercion may emerge from within the very communities considering resettlement, either from a 
small minority of the population wanting to stay (coercion by the minority) or from a larger 
number of people keen to reach the necessary threshold required for relocation (coercion by the 
majority)—two sources of coercion that were largely absent from previous studies on 
resettlement and contentious politics. 
All communities, big and small, have their own power dynamics. Talks of resettlement 
can bring to the surface within-community power differentials, and these inequalities may 
manifest themselves in the form of coercive pressures. In this context, some people may be 
presented with the option to relocate and earn a living elsewhere or to stay put, but the most 
vulnerable or marginalized people (that is, elderly or unemployed) rarely are. Even in a 
democratic context such as NL, where households vote on and receive financial compensation 
for relocating, it is difficult to remove indirect coercion from the resettlement equation. While 
this case study does not necessarily delegitimize such policies, nor label them authoritarian or 
even illiberal practices (Glasius, 2018),8  it does force scholars and policy makers to 
acknowledge the internal power dynamics at play even in so-called community-oriented 
programs like the CRP and to try to even out the playing field. It also provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the various sources of coercive pressures in democratic contexts and forces us 
to scrutinize the labelling of “voluntary” and “coerced” resettlement. 
While acknowledging the particular historical, social and economic circumstances of NL, 
much can be gained by placing the CRP in conversation with other contemporary resettlement 
projects. Studies on resettlement politics would do well to investigate the many forms 
resettlement may take and the various roles played by state and nonstate actors. In Ireland, for 
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instance, urban underemployed households wishing to relocate to rural areas—and rural 
communities wishing to make housing available to resettled families—may call on a grassroots 
organization called Rural Resettlement Ireland to facilitate the process (Rosegrant, 2002). The 
creation of a global resettlement typology that categorizes resettlement projects according to 
their agendas (rural development, mitigating community isolation, coastal retreat), main actors 
(government, NGO) and procedures (voting thresholds, individual or community-level 
compensation) is a worthwhile project for future scholars, as it would help to shed further light 
on the factors that mitigate the contentious politics surrounding resettlement. Given how many 
rural communities throughout the Western world are faced with uneven economic growth, 
declining demographics and climate change–induced hazards (Hamilton et al., 2016), the 
ongoing resettlement processes in NL and Ireland offer contrasting policy templates worth closer 
examination.
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Notes 
1 Although the term resettlement is often applied to the relocation of international migrants or refugee populations 
(for example, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] program), we focus on the 
resettlement of internal migrants, while acknowledging that these movements often overlap (see Lyons and Ford, 
2007). 
2 While the latest NL program officially uses the name relocation, the scholarly literature on the topic tends to use 
resettlement. For this reason, we use the terms interchangeably. 
3 NL has a long history of resettlement projects since it joined the Canadian Confederation, some of which involve 
Indigenous communities (Macdonald, 2002). The contentious aspects of earlier resettlement programs, briefly 
covered in this article, are elaborated at length elsewhere (see, for example, CBC, 2012; Withers, 2016; Loo, 2019). 
4 One instance of contentious politics may be coded as having multiple contributing factors. 
5 See Table 5 for a summary of NL communities that have applied for CRPs since 2009, including estimated 
permanent population, motives for relocation and latest status. 
6 We thank one of our reviewers for pointing this out. 
7 This may be explained by the fact that former resettled homes remain somewhat accessible. A clause in the CRP 
allows property owners who have received relocation assistance to retain title to their properties and access them as 
desired. However, people first need to obtain a permit to occupy properties in “vacated communities” as per the 
Evacuated Communities Act, 2016, and accessing and occupying properties in relocated communities is done so at 
the cost of/ risk of property owners (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2016; Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019). 
8 According to Glasius (2018: 517), authoritarian practices are “patterns of action that sabotage accountability to 
people over whom a political actors exerts control, or their representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and 
disabling voice.” In contrast, illiberal practices refer to “patterned and organized infringements of individual 
autonomy and dignity.” They are primarily a human rights problem. 
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 Table 1  
Phases of Population Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador and Key Characteristics 
  
Name  Years  Government unit involved 
Average/ 
maximum amount 
per household Conditions for relocation 
Program 1 
(1954–1965) 
Provincial Centralization 
Plan 
1953–1965 Provincial Ministry of 
Public Welfare 
$300 (average), 
$600 (maximum) 
100% adult-age members 
community sign petition 
Program 2 
(1965–1977) 
Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program 
1965–1970 Provincial Department of 
Fisheries and Federal 
Department of Fisheries 
$1,000 + $200 / 
adult member 
90%, then 80% (after 1967) of 
householders sign petition 
Resettlement Scheme 1970–1977 Provincial Department of 
Community and Social 
Development and Federal 
Department of Regional 
Economic Expansion 
$7,000 80% of householders sign petition 
Program 3 
(2009– ) 
Community Relocation 
Policy 
2009–2013 Provincial Department of 
Municipal Affairs 
$100,000 
(maximum) 
Costs and benefits analysis 
indicating savings over 20 years + 
90% of permanent residents vote in 
favour 
Revised Community 
Relocation Policy 
2013–2016 Provincial Department of 
Municipal Affairs 
$270,000 
(maximum) 
(same as above) 
Revised Community 
Relocation Policy 
2016– Provincial Department of 
Municipal Affairs 
$270,000 
(maximum) 
Cost/benefit analysis indicating 
savings over 10, 15 and 20 years + 
90% of year-round residents voting 
in favour 
 
 Table 2  
Number of Articles Covering NL Resettlement and News Source 
News source Number of relevant articles 
Globe and Mail  5 
Western Star 18 
Telegram 37 
CBC 28 
Total N 88 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3  
Code Occurrence of Contentious Politics during CRPs and Populations Involved 
Resettlement 
period 
Community vs. 
government 
Within 
communities 
Resettled vs. 
host 
communities Total N 
2009–2016 48 31 0     79 
 
  
 Table 4 
Underlying Factors behind Contentious Events by Resettlement Periods 
Resettlement 
periods 
Lack info and 
resources 
Inadequate 
financial 
compensation 
Decision 
process 
Coercive 
pressures Total N 
2009–2016 29 8 27 45 109 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5  
Summary of NL Communities That Have Applied for CRP since 2009 
 Year 
process 
initiated 
Reasons for 
relocation 
request 
Population Status  
Gaultois 2015 Isolation, 
declining 
population, 
general store 
closed 
Approximately 
130 (as of 
Oct. 2016) 
Not relocated 
(insufficient 
interest) 
Grand Bruit 2007 Declining 
population, 
unemployment, 
school closure 
due to lack of 
young people, 
closure of 
general store, 
post office, 
church 
31 residents 
(as of 2009) 
Relocated July 
2010 
Little Bay Islands 2011 Declining and 
aging 
population, fish 
plant closure 
61 residents 
(as of 2016) 
Waiting (approved 
since 2019, waiting 
for government 
approval) 
McCallum 2014 Isolation (only 
accessible by 
air/ferry) 
79 residents Not relocated 
(insufficient 
interest) 
Nipper’s Harbour 2013 Isolation, aging 
population, 
aging 
infrastructure 
46 residents Not relocated (did 
not pass 
cost/benefit 
analysis) 
Round Harbour 2010 Unidentified 2 permanent 
residents, 4 
Waiting (approved 
since 2010, waiting 
 commercial 
property 
owners 
for government 
approval) 
Snook’s Arm 2013 Isolation, 
safety, 
difficulties in 
sustaining 
residents’ 
lifestyle 
10 residents 
(as of 2016) 
Waiting 
(approved since 
2015, waiting for 
government 
approval) 
William’s 
Harbour 
2013 Declining 
population, no 
medical clinic, 
problems with 
water system 
26 residents 
(as of 2015) 
Relocated 2017 
